Postal Employees Are Not Protected From Garnishment by Markey, Kathleen
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 31 Number 2 Article 10 
1-1-1977 
Postal Employees Are Not Protected From Garnishment 
Kathleen Markey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Kathleen Markey, Postal Employees Are Not Protected From Garnishment, 31 U. Miami L. Rev. 436 (1977) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol31/iss2/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
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based upon indirectly affiliating circumstances.' It is hoped that
the Supreme Court will soon confront this issue and will invalidate
the use of the quasi in rem concept. Even if the concept continues
to withstand attack, current due process standards of fair play sug-
gest that quasi in rem jurisdiction should not be a sufficiently com-
pelling state interest to override the requirements of prior notice and
hearing.
JAMES S. CARMICHAEL
Postal Employees Are Not Protected From
Garnishment
The doctrine of sovereign immunity no longer protects the wages
of postal employees from garnishment. The traditional ban on
garnishment on the grounds of immunity of the government from
suit is no longer applicable to the United States Postal Service
after the Postal Reorganization Act which created an indepen-
dent federal agency amenable to suit.
In each of three district court cases, a garnishment summons
directed to the United States Postal Service (USPS) to effect judg-
ments in state courts was challenged by the federal government.
The district court quashed the garnishment summons in each case
on the basis that the USPS, as an independent establishment of the
executive branch of the federal government performing a govern-
mental function, was immune to suit. On appeal brought by the
judgment creditors, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit held, reversed per curiam: The Postal Reorganization
Act created an independent postal business and contains an implied
Congressional waiver of governmental immunity thus subjecting the
Postal Service to garnishment procedures to effect judgments in
state courts. Standard Oil Division, American Oil Co. v. Starks, 528
F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1975).
With the increasing role played by the federal government in
our society and with the resulting increase in the number of public
81. Specific jurisdiction is the assertion of power to adjudicate, limited to matters arising
out of or intimately related to affiliating circumstances on which the jurisdictional claim is
based. The indirectly affiliating circumstances supporting jurisdiction have been categorized
into (a) the continuous relationship of the defendant to the forum and (b) isolated events or
transactions. See Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analy.is, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144-48 (1966).
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employees,' cases pertaining to garnishment of federal governmen-
tal employees are of considerable interest. The decision in Standard
Oil is of particular interest for it represents a reversal in the law of
garnishment of postal employees.
Generally, under the doctrine of governmental immunity the
United States cannot be sued without its consent.' This doctrine
seems to have its historic roots in the early common law belief that
"the King can do no wrong" since the king in feudal England was
not subject to suit in his own court.' Sovereign immunity most likely
originated as a power concept. Nobody had to provide a rationale
for the serfs who understood royal prerogative full well. In this coun-
try the doctrine seems to have been carried over primarily because
it is a convenient doctrine; it is much easier not to be sued than it
is to defend.4 Additional reasons have been found
imbedded in our legal philosophy. They partake somewhat of
dignity and decorum, somewhat of practical administration,
somewhat of the political desirability of an impregnable legal
citadel where government as distinct from its functionaries may
operate undisturbed by the demands of litigants.'
This doctrine has been rationalized within a democratic gov-
ernment by both practical and policy reasons; its continued exist-
ence has been justified by alluding to the danger and inconvenience
that would ensue from undue judicial intervention in the affairs of
government. It has been argued that the government must have
flexibility and power in order to operate efficiently, and that only
governmental immunity can assure that flexibility and power. In an
early case where the United States Supreme Court attempted to
justify reliance upon the doctrine, the Court emphasized this point:
The principle is fundamental, applies to every sovereign power,
and but for the protection which it affords, the government would
be unable to perform the various duties for which it was created.7
1. 1974 labor statistics place the number of federal civilian governmental employees at
2,874,000. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS
1975-REFERENCE EDITION 119 (1975). For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, the total
number of postal employees was 702,257. 1974-1975 ANN. REP. OF POSTMASTER GENERAL 53.
2. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
3. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 970 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Mikva, Sovereign Immunity: In a Democracy the Emperor Has No Clothes, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 828, 846.
5. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940).
6. See Lawyer, Birth and Death of Governmental Immunity, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 529,
533 (1966).
7. Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1869).
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Governmental immunity seems to be well-suited for, and par-
ticularly convenient in, cases involving use of funds of the public
treasury. Naturally, there is a strong policy rationale for protecting
public funds. Wherever the judgment sought would expend itself on
the public treasury, it has been construed as a suit against the
sovereign.' Traditionally, wages of government employees have not
been subject to garnishment because courts have considered the
money sought to be garnished as still constituting a part of the
public treasury and legally belonging to the government even
though the employee may be entitled to a specific portion of it.' The
immunity of the sovereign, then, has protected the United States
Government from being summoned as a garnishee in any action
without its consent.
This rigid doctrine has gradually been eroded and exceptions
have been created-exceptions necessary in a democratic system to
ensure that private citizens have some remedy when harmed by
governmental conduct. Redress now may be secured in several ways:
(1) a private person may sue a government officer as an individual
if the officer exceeds his authority;'" (2) under the Tucker Act, Con-
gress has established federal liability for contracts;" (3) likewise,
under the Federal Tort Claims Act there is statutory liability for
torts; (4) there are nonstatutory, nonmonetary remedies and non-
remedies including habeas corpus, injunction, and mandamus; 3
and (5) in many areas of governmental activity, independent regula-
tory agenices operate with their own specific statutory review proce-
dures. 4
The exceptions do not cover all categories of suits. Therefore,
the courts have had to look further in order to circumvent the rigid
rule of governmental immunity and to enable citizens in a demo-
cratic system to obtain effective relief against their government.
With the proliferation of governmental agencies since the New Deal
legislation, courts have sought to find an intention to waive immun-
ity when Congress set up the particular instrumentality. In Keifer
8. E.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
9. Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 20 (1846), established this early rule as a
reason, in addition to the policy grounds, for protecting public funds.
10. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Waller v. Professional Ins. Corp., 299 F.2d 193
(5th Cir. 1962).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), (1970).
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1970).
13. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for
Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Parties




& Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 5 the United States
Supreme Court established the rule that an instrumentality of the
government can be set up as an independent corporation which does
not automatically receive the immunity of the sovereign. In FHA v.
Burr, ' a garnishment proceeding against the housing agency, the
Court held that garnishment proceedings could be filed against the
federal agency by finding an implied legislative intent to waive
immunity in the statutory authorization of the agency "to sue and
be sued." A rule was established providing that in the absence of a
contrary showing,
it must be presumed that when Congress launched a governmen-
tal agency into the commercial world and endowed it with au-
thority "to sue or be sued," that agency is not less amenable to
judicial process than a private enterprise under like circumstan-
ces would be. 7
Furthermore, the Court, in a third case, explicitly declared that
"the mere fact that it is an agency of the government does not
extend to it the immunity of the sovereign."'"
The principles of these three cases are pivotal" to the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of the "sue and be sued" clause in the postal
enabling statute.'" Relying upon Keifer, the court found that Con-
gressional inclusion of the clause in the statute indicated that there
was legislative consideration of the applicability of sovereign im-
15. 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
16. 309 U.S. 242 (1940).
17. Id. at 245. But see Chewning v. District of Columbia, 119 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 639 (1941), holding that the District of Columbia, although a body corporate
for municipal purposes, is immune to a garnishment proceeding because it is not a modern
federal corporation launched into the commercial world in the context of Burr, and because
it exercises many of the same governmental functions as do the states.
18. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 83 (1941). The Court
found nothing in the legislative history of the statute establishing the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation to indicate that Congress intended that the "sue and be sued" clause should not
subject the agency to the ordinary incidents of litigation. But cf. Small Business Administra-
tion v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960), where the Court found the Small Business Adminis-
tration entitled to the priority of the United States Government in a bankruptcy proceeding
because it constituted an integral part of a governmental mechanism. Although the enabling
statute of the Small Business Administration contained a "sue and be sued," clause (15
U.S.C. § 634(b)(1) (1970)) the Court in McClellan distinguished the decision in J.G. Menihan
Corp. narrowly on its facts: The holding that the Corporation "could be assessed costs . . .
lof al suit it brought . . . . would not support a holding that the Small Business Administra-
tion is not the United States for the purpose of bankruptcy priority." 364 U.S. at 449.
19. The court declared that the three cases controlled. 528 F.2d at 202.
20. The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970. (Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719), trans-
formed the United States Post Office into the United States Postal Service. The enabling act
gives the USPS the power "[tlo sue and be sued in its official name." 39 U.S.C. § 401(1)
(1970).
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munity to the independent agency. It was found not to be war-
ranted. The conferral of the power to sue and be sued on the Postal
Service by Congress constitutes an implied amenability to suit.',
Moreover, Congress granted the USPS broad powers" to function
and operate as an independent agency. This serves to reinforce the
conclusion that Congress intended a waiver of immunity. 3 Further-
more, the enabling staute specifically carries out the purpose of the
Postal Reorganization Act by disestablishing the Post Office De-
partment, a Cabinet level executive agency, and establishing in its
place the USPS, an independent establishment of the executive
branch."
21. See Kennedy Elec. Co. v. USPS, 508 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1974), holding that the
USPS was as amenable to suit as any private enterprise after finding no Congressional intent
to constrict the "sue and be sued" clause.
22. 39 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) provides:
The Postal Service shall have the following general powers:
(1) To sue and be sued in its official name;
(2) To adopt, amend, and repeal such rules and regulations as it deems
necessary to accomplish the objectives of this title;
(3) To enter into and perform contracts, execute instruments, and deter-
mine the character of, and necessity for, its expenditures;
(4) To determine and keep its own system of accounts and the forms and
contents of its contracts and other business documents, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this title;
(5) To acquire, in any lawful manner, such personal or real property, or any
interest therein, as it deems necessary or convenient in the transaction of its
business; to hold, maintain, sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of such property or
any interest therein; and to provide services in connection therewith and charges
therefor;
(6) To construct, operate, lease and maintain buildings, facilities, equip-
ment, and other improvements on any property owned or controlled by it, includ-
ing, without limitation, any property or interest therein transferred to it under
section 2002 of this title;
(7) To accept gifts or donations of services or property, real or personal, as
it deems, necessary or convenient in the transaction of its business;
(8) To settle and compromise claims by or against it;
(9) To exercise, in the name of the United States, the right of eminent
domain for the furtherance of its official purposes; and to have the priority of the
United States with respect to the payment of debts out of bankrupt, insolvent,
and decedents' estates; and
(10) To have all other powers incidental, necessary, or appropriate to the
carrying on of its functions or the exercise of its specific powers.
23. In addition, the court noted that the enabling statute (39 U.S.C. §§ 409(b), (c)
(1970)) specifically provides for two exceptions to amenability to suit by requiring consent to
suit in two instances: (1) procedural matters and (2) the applicability of the Federal Tort
Claims Act which conclusively confirms the intention of waiver of immunity. 528 F.2d at 203.
24. 39 U.S.C. § 201 (1970). See Leonard v. USPS, 489 F.2d 814 (1st Cir. 1974) (USPS
can independently settle one of its claims, contrary to the advice of the United States Attor-




Therefore, -the court found the USPS to be an independent
agency conducting a commercial business within the meaning of
Burr and subject to all types of litigation. In so doing, the court
rejected the lower court's reliance upon two district court cases pre-
serving governmental immunity for the USPS in garnishment pro-
ceedings: Detroit Window Cleaners Local 139 Insurance Fund v.
Griffin 5 and Lawhorn v. Lawhorn. 5 In both cases the function of the
Postal Service, to deliver the mail, was not viewed as essentially a
commercial business transaction with the public. Instead, the
courts determined that the Postal Service constituted an exception
to the Burr doctrine because it was a "delegee of specific constitu-
tional authority from Congress to perform an exclusively govern-
mental function."27 In disputing this contention, the Seventh Cir-
cuit argued that the USPS's operations are not exclusively govern-
mental because many of its powers are common to all businesses,"
and, most significantly, even the "delivery of mail itself is not inher-
ently an operation that must be government-operated .. "2" The
court pointed out that mail delivery in the United States today is
conducted by private services, such as the Private Postal System of
America in Florida, as well as by the USPS.
3
1
A second set of reasons given for preserving governmental im-
munity in garnishment proceedings, rejected in the instant case, is
that to subject the USPS to garnishment for possible debts of all its
employees would impose a "grave interference" with governmental
functions, 31 or place an unnecessary burden on efficient and eco-
nomical operation of the Postal Service.32 These factors have been
given significant weight in cases in which courts have recognized
exceptions to the general rule of Burr. In order to come within the
exceptions, however,
it must be clearly shown that certain types of suits are not consis-
tent with the statutory or constitutional scheme, that an implied
restriction of the general authority is necessary to avoid grave
25. 345 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
26. 351 F. Supp. 1399 (S.D.W. Va. 1972).
27. 345 F. Supp. at 1345; accord, Nolan v. Woodruff, 68 F.R.D. 660 (D.D.C. 1975); Drs.
Macht, Podore & Associates v. Girton, 392 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Lawhorn v. Law.
horn, 351 F. Supp. 1399 (S.D.W. Va. 1972).
28. See 39 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
29. 528 F.2d at 204. Congress is empowered "[to establish Post Offices. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
30. 528 F.2d at 204.
31. Lawhorn v. Lawhorn, 351 F. Supp. 1399, 1400 (S.D.W. Va. 1972).
32. Detroit Window Cleaners Local 139 Ins. Fund v. Griffin, 345 F. Supp. 1343, 1344
(E.D. Mich. 1972); accord, Drs. Macht, Podore & Associates v. Girton, 392 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.
Ohio 1975).
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interference with the performance of a governmental function, or
that for other reasons it was plainly the purpose of Congress to
use the "sue and be sued" clause in a narrow sense.33
In the instant case since there was no clear showing of interference
or burden upon the delivery of mail, 34 the court held that the waiver
of immunity should be liberally construed.35
As a final reason for rejecting governmental immunity for the
USPS, the court noted the continued and widespread dissatisfac-
tion with the doctrine itself.3 " The primary objection to the doctrine
seems to be that it interferes with the ability of citizens to obtain
effective relief against the United States and its instrumentalities
"in the peaceable course of law."37 The essential and sound policy
underlying governmental immunity, that courts should not engage
in undue intervention in the affairs of government, is not under-
mined when immunity is disallowed in garnishment suits against
independent agencies.
The reasons this policy is not undermined are several. First,
where an agency like the USPS is established as an independent
commercial business, it should have both the powers and the res-
ponsibilities of a like private enterprise. Conferring broad immunity
to suit upon the government (except for important reasons) is con-
ducive to unjust results. Second, any public policy rationale of pro-
tecting the public funds should not extend to the situation where
the funds are already committed to the employee. Since the USPS
owed a duty to pay these funds to the employee, it is arguable that
no undue burden results from a court order requiring that the money
be paid a creditor instead. Third, although it may be desirable to
disallow garnishment of wages of those governmental employees
whose responsibilities are such that the pressure of creditors would
involve the risk of interfering with or unduly burdening the govern-
ment, the vast majority of positions occupied today by government
33. FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
34. A district court, in Colonial Bank v. Broussard, 403 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. La. 1975),
reached a similar conclusion after finding that in order for a suit to fit within the exceptions
it must present a " 'grave,' as opposed to 'appreciable,' interference with the operations of
the Postal Service." Id. at 687. See also White v. Bloomberg, 501 F.2d 1379 (4th Cir. 1974),
holding that payment by the USPS of post-judgment interest on its debt would not interfere
with postal operations.
35. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939), established the
principle that waivers by Congress of governmental immunity should be liberally construed.
36. 528 F.2d at 203. In 1939 the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the disfavor
with the doctrine and gave this as one reason for applying a liberal construction to any
implied waivers by Congress. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 391
(1939).
37. Cramton, supra note 13, at 389.
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employees are not significantly different from jobs held by employ-
ees in the private sector. To disallow garnishment where there is no
showing of significant intrusion on the administration of govern-
ment is not supported by any justifiable public policy.
The decision in Standard Oil is sound jurisprudence. It recog-
nizes the need for change in the application of a doctrine which
yields incomplete and inadequate redress for a judgment creditor of
a governmental employee. Since the only sound rationale existing
today for the doctrine of governmental immunity to be applied in
this type of garnishment proceeding, in a democratic society, is that
the official activities of the government must be protected from
undue or indiscriminate judicial interference,3" there is no justifica-
tion for reliance upon the doctrine in order to limit the effectiveness
of garnishment proceedings upon employees of "independent" gov-
ernmental agencies.
KATHLEEN MARKEY
38. Id. at 397.
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